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"What You Don't Know Can't Hurt You": The 
Right to Know and the Shetland Island Oil Spill 
Gregory V. Button 1 
This paper, an account of the Shetland Islands oil spill (1993), examines the 
public health controversies surrounding the spill and the clean-up response. It 
critically examines the risk management policies of both the United Kingdom 
and the Shetland Islands Public Health Office, and suggests that the 
withhoMing of  critical information contributed to increased anxiety and 
suspicion among the disaster victims. In an attempt to reassure the victims, 
the policies contributed to an increased air of uncertainty. It is further argued 
that the withholding of information prevents those who are at greatest risk 
from participating in critical decisions that may affect their health and 
livelihoods and asserts that a right-to-know policy is a critical first step in risk 
management practices. 
KEY WORDS: Shetland Islands; oil spill; risk management; right-to-know; technological 
disasters. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chronic technological disasters are axial events because, as Eric Wolf 
(1990) has argued, "the arrangements of society become most visible when 
they are challenged by crisis." The study of these disasters is a quintessen- 
tial example of the "anthropology of trouble" (Rappaport, 1993). In the 
aftermath of such disasters, people struggle to make sense of the event by 
interpreting it and assigning meaning and significance to the disaster. Dis- 
aster victims ask such questions as "Why me? .... Who is responsible? .... Who 
is to blame?" The turmoil that is engendered often creates radical shifts 
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in people's world view. Often the frustrating failure to prevent such disas- 
ters and to respond satisfactorily to them brings into question social ar- 
rangements. In an atmosphere of uncertainty and a sense of the loss of 
control, there emerges a context over the way things are understood. The 
very process of meaning-making results in a bargaining about the meaning 
of reality (Comaroff & Roberts, 1981; Rosen, 1984). In the conflict that is 
bom of this process of meaning-making, people's ability to persuade others 
of their interpretation of reality, their perception of the problem, hinges 
on their power to do so (Edelman, 1977; Gusfield, 1981; Merry, 1990). In 
our own discourse about disasters it is paramount that we keep in mind 
what they can reveal about the social arrangements of society. 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE RIGHT-TO-KNOW 
Some of the most troubling questions raised in the wake of a 
technological disaster concern what public health officials know about the 
potential deleterious effects of the disaster and when (and if) they relay 
what they know to the general public (Levine, 1982; Jasanoff, 1988; Clarke, 
1989; Reich, 1991; Button, 1993). A comparative analysis of technological 
disasters during the last two decades reveals that whether the disaster is 
located in Chernobyl, Love Canal, Bhopal, or Seveso, departments of public 
health have become departments of "reassurance," rather than candid 
bureaucracies that allow an informed public to make decisions about the 
well-being of their community. 2 This approach may well be modeled, as 
Anthony Wallace (1987) has so astutely observed, on the contemporary 
approach to "risk management" which is predicated on the notion of a 
pressured bureaucrat who views public anxiety as a major administrative 
problem rather than being based on the perspective of the public which 
tends to view the real threat to public safety. Risk management strategies 
can run the risk of being too concerned with managing people's responses 
and diminishing the air of uncertainty, rather than with the actual 
management of risks. 
Like the stochastic systems of risk analysis with their striving for 
"objective assessment" and their negation of the individual experience and 
the nonquantitative aspects of risk, risk management practices can exclude 
the perception and voice of the people exposed to risk. While risk analysts 
usually limit their definitions of risk to probability and magnitude, lay 
people in making risk assessments take into account qualitative factors such 
as equity, fairness, and controllability (Slovic, 1987). 
2See Ozonoff & Boden's (1987) superb analysis of public health agencies. 
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The traditional problem-solving, institutionalized approaches of risk 
management do not serve the interests of local people nor can they 
perceive or articulate the concerns of local people because their very 
"objectivity" separates scientists from what is happening on the ground. 
Within such an approach there is little or no place for the native's 
perception and evaluation of risk (Rappaport, 1988). The failure to include 
this perspective alone suggests that anthropology -- which values the native 
point  of view -- can make a significant contr ibut ion to both  risk 
management/risk analysis and disaster research in general. 3 
An important component of risk analysis and risk management is 
public access to information. In democratic countries, the notion of a 
"right-to-know" resonates with cultural values to valorize the individual and 
his or her right to make informed decisions about health matters. However, 
governments and their agencies often construe differently from their 
citizens what their responsibility is for insuring access to information. Even 
in democratic nations which stress participatory decision-making public 
health officials have been reluctant to communicate in a forthright manner 
(Jasanoff, 1988). 
To a large degree, government bureaucrats have taken their cue from 
the private sector. In many cases, the corporations involved in the contro- 
versies following a technological disaster adopt a public relations strategy 
that attempts to create a sense of certainty amid the atmosphere of uncer- 
tainty (Marrett, 1981). It is my contention that too many public health agen- 
cies are adopting a similar strategy. Public health policies formulated in 
response to technological disasters limit public discourse about scientific 
information and unwittingly, and perhaps at times, wittingly serve 
hegemonic interests beyond the public health domain. The fairness of the 
debate about the interpretation of a technological disaster in terms of as- 
signing blame and responsibility, and what remedial and compensatory ap- 
proaches should be taken, hinges on the availability of critical information. 
The Shetland Island oil spill serves as a classic example of the controversies 
surrounding such a debate and underscores the need to conceptualize haz- 
ardous environmental risk issues in context of human rights: namely the 
right-to-know. This assertion is predicated on the dictum offered by 
Shrader-Frechette (1991): "that there ought to be no imposition of risk, 
without the free informed consent of those who must bear it." The follow- 
ing ethnographic case study is based on original fieldwork that I conducted 
in the Shetland Islands shortly after the spill occurred. 
3Along with Lave (1986), Latin (1988), and Freudenberg (1988), I view both risk analysis and 
risk management as one integrative process. 
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THE SHETLAND ISLAND OIL SPILL 
On January 5th, 1993, the American-owned oil tanker Braer went 
aground at Garth's Ness on the southern tip of the Shetland Islands. Amid 
a hurricane, the tanker was smashed into several sections and spilled 84,413 
tons of Norwegian crude oil into the North Sea. This spillage was approxi- 
mately twice the amount of the oil spilled in Alaska, by official estimate, 
following the wreck of the Exxon-Valdez. Coincidentally, this oil tanker 
wreck, the largest since the catastrophe in Alaska, also occurred at 60 de- 
grees north latitude. 
The Shetlands are an island archipelago located approximately 250 
miles due west of Bergen, Norway and over 250 miles north of Aberdeen, 
Scotland. As in Alaska, many of the 22,500 inhabitants depend on maritime 
resources for their livelihoods. Until the 1970s, economic livelihood on this 
remote region centered largely around fishing, wool, crofting, knitting, and 
subsistence farming. With the discovery of large quantities of oil 60 miles 
off Shetland's eastern shores, Sullom Voe, the largest oil port in Europe 
was constructed on the northern tip of the island (Rosen & Vorhees-Rosen, 
1978). 4 While their are significant differences between the two spills, the 
Shetland Islands oil spill parallels the spill in Alaska in one other significant 
way. In Alaska, a minority ethnic group, Native Alaskans, were most ad- 
versely affected by the disaster and the clean-up that followed. In a similarly 
disturbing way, the "native" people of the Shetlands were also most ad- 
versely affected by the spill and the response effort. In both instances, the 
cultural way of life of both marginalized groups were threatened by the 
disasters and the emergency responses made by officials. 
Sensing a story bigger than even the Exxon-Valdez spill, reporters from 
all over the world flocked to this remote northern island within hours. The 
press corps were not the only ones who had the Exxon-Valdez on their 
mind. Shetland Island officials and Scottish Office officials feared a tragedy 
of the magnitude of the Alaskan disaster, as well as criticism similar to the 
controversies surrounding the Eaxon-Valdez clean-up effort. 5 The ferocious 
winds blew not just oil vapors but oil droplets inland clear across the island 
4In the 1960s, oil companies began to explore the North Sea for oil. In 1956, Britain and 
Norway formally agreed on how to divide the North Sea right down the middle. In 1969, 
Philips Petroleum discovered oil on the Norwegian side, and in late 1970, British Petroleum 
discovered oil on the British side (Yergin, 1992). 
Sin keeping with most European government practices, the United Kingdom assumed 
responsibility for the clean-up of the oil spill. This is in direct contradistinction to the United 
States' Government's decision to place Exxon in charge of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill. Although 
there are provisions under U.S. federal law to "federalize" a spill clean-up, the current 
practice in the United States is to hold the polluter responsible for the clean-up. For more 
information, see U.S. Congress Office Technology Report (1990). 
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coating the houses and land of nearby communities with a brown gooey 
slime. Despite hurricane force gale winds and rough seas, officials decided 
to spray over 120 tons of chemical dispersants in 48 hours. 6 While virtually 
ineffectual on the crude oil along the rocky coast, the dispersants contami- 
nated the Shetland Islands' prime agricultural land and most of the nearby 
inhabitants, as well as several thousand sheep and cattle which had no shel- 
ter from either the storm or the chemical sprays. 7 
Four communities lie in close proximity to the island's airport and 
the tip of Garth's Ness. As United Kingdom airplanes took off from the 
runways they began spraying these toxic chemicals as soon as their wheels 
were up, in other words, at an altitude of 30 feet over the adjacent com- 
munities. 8 The 3000 residents of Dunross Parish (located on the southern 
end of the islands) were not warned to stay indoors, were not informed of 
the times of the spraying, nor were they evacuated from the region. 9 By 
the time the spraying was terminated, almost all the inhabitants on the 
western side of the southern end of the island had been exposed to both 
the dispersants and the oil, including 18 pregnant women, most of whom 
were in the their first trimester of pregnancy. 
6According to Malcolm Green, Executive Director of the Shetland Islands Council, and other 
sources, Green demanded that the U.K.'s Marine Pollution Control Unit (MPCU) assure 
him that the dispersants had been tested for safe use around humans. The MPCU gave 
Green assurances dispersants were safe. He later told me he was furious when he learned 
this statement was less than accurate. Ever since the sinking of the Torrey Canyon oil tanker 
off the coast of Great Britain in 1967, dispersants have had a bad name. The British dumped 
a phenomenal 10,000 tons of dispersants on 14,000 tons of crude oil. When the dispersants 
failed to work the Royal Navy Air Corps dive bombed the tanker attempting to set if afire. 
By then the oil had mixed with the water and their attempts failed. Dispersants are solvents 
that are used to breakdown the cohesiveness of the oil. They are sprayed on an oil spill in 
order to remove the oil from the surface of the water. The chemical agents cause the oil to 
enter the water column in tiny droplets. The oil droplets are then dispersed in the water 
column and become diluted ostensibly until they are in such low concentrations that they 
are considered harmless to the environment. Early dispersants were considered toxic, but 
current ones are considered somewhat less toxic (National Research Council, 1989). In rough 
seas and high winds, such as the conditions surrounding the wreck of the Braer, dispersants 
have been found to be ineffective. 
7This was not the first time Shetland livestock were affected by an oil spill. On December 
30, 1978, the Esso Britanica hit a concrete pier in the Sullom Voe port and spilled 1174 tons 
of oil. A flock of 2000 sheep grazing along the shore on an island across the sound were 
covered with oil. Fifty sheep were reported to have died from the oil (Wills, 1991, p. 87). 
SAmong my informants was a couple whose house was literally just several hundred feet from 
the edge of the end of the runway. The wife, who was pregnant, described being sprayed by 
the planes as she was approaching her cottage. 
9Dr. Cox told me that they did not evacuate the 600 residents of the four communities because 
they did not want to create an air of uncertainty or arouse public fear. However, Dr. Hall told 
me that Cox initially was for evacuation until he spoke with Dr. Forbes of the Scottish Home 
Office. Pubic officials have often cited the fear of public panic for their reluctance to release 
all the information about disasters, however, research by Mileti et al. (1975), has demonstrated 
that in the face of a disaster most individuals do not become hysterical or irrational. 
246 Button 
The public health advisory issued by the Shetland Islands Council and 
by the local public health office simply advised residents to minimize skin 
contact with the oil and dispersants and stay indoors; advice that was dif- 
ficult for the crofters who had to attend to their animals day and night 
during the storm and to the local school children who had to twice daily 
wait for school buses. Many of the other locals who had to go outside to 
commute  to their jobs, and hundreds of airport employees were constantly 
exposed to the dispersants while at work. Only a small number  of  residents 
were provided with proper  respiratory masks. For most, staying indoors did 
little good since even when they remained indoors they were nauseated by 
the odors that  lingered in their homes for several days after  the crisis 
passed. 1~ 
Moreover,  during the first 10 days of the disaster there was no official 
clinical monitoring of the residents' health. The assessment of public health 
was impai red  by the lack of necessary equipment  for moni tor ing and 
measuring pollution levels. Most of  the monitoring that was conducted was 
for gaseous hydrocarbon levels. There was no monitoring of oil droplets 
and no equ ipment  for the moni tor ing of chemical  d ispersants  in- the 
atmosphere.  The chemical content of  the dispersants was unknown to both 
the people using them and those accidentally exposed to them. For  the 
first 48 hours not  even the Is land's  health official knew the chemical 
composition of the dispersants. The  content of dispersants is generally a 
mixture of  solvents and detergents many of  which are toxic, however, their 
level of  toxicity varies, and in some cases the toxicity of  a dispersant is 
largely unknown. 
Once Dr. Cox, the local public health official, was informed of the 
chemicals used in the spray he withheld the information from all other of- 
ficials and the general public because of "commercial confidentiality." As 
Dr. Cox would later bemoan, his refusal to release this information and the 
chemical companies '  insistence on withholding the information from the 
public n was the largest single factor for the pervasive feeling among the 
Shetlanders that there was a conspiracy to withhold vital information. 12 
1~ Gerald Forbes, the Director of the Environmental Health Unit at the Scottish Office 
made a public statement that there was no health risk from the odors. Forbes contended 
that the tests made inside the homes revealed there were no measurable hydrocarbons. The 
homes, however, were not tested for the presence of other harmful chemicals that were in 
the oil and dispersants. 
11A British Petroleum employee told me that BP sent their employees (since BP operates the 
Sullum Voe oil terminal they employee a sizable number of people) a memo which told 
them that BP was going to "keep their heads down" and make no comment on the spill. 
Since there are so many BP employees in the Shetlands the rumor of this memo spread 
rapidly. A number of people told me that they interpreted this as yet another indication that 
a conspiracy was afoot. While BP had nothing whatsoever to do with the oil spill they were 
the manufacturers of one of the dispersants that were being used. 
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Eventually, the high winds and rough seas split the tanker asunder 
and the oil appeared to wash out to sea, posing apparently little threat to 
the islands. But by the time the crisis had passed, all of the agricultural 
land and the adjacent salmon farms were condemned because of contami- 
nation from both the oil and the dispersants. Several million farm salmon 
had to be destroyed and a huge fish exclusion zone was established off the 
coast. While the international media corps went home disappointed that 
there wasn't a story as sensational as the Exxon-Valdez, an extended con- 
troversy began on the island that was all but ignored by everyone but the 
local press. With complaints of too few dead animals to photograph and 
severe weather that kept most indoors, the world press ignored the human 
story that unfolded (Button, 1994a). 
THE PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS 
Almost immediately after the dispersants were sprayed, hundreds of 
Dunross Parish residents complained of eye and skin irritation, headaches, 
and diarrhea. Over 40 people experienced severe asthmatic responses. 
Later more than 250 people would demonstrate abnormal lung functioning. 
A smaller number would have test results that demonstrated renal and liver 
malfunction. Many of the local residents became alarmed. When Green- 
peace and an environmental group from Norway disseminated literature 
that criticized the use of dispersants, residents grew uneasy. The also 
pointed out that dispersants have never been approved for use around hu- 
mans and have unpredictable biological effects. The environmentalists cited 
reports that dispersants may adversely affect the amount of oil absorbed 
by the lungs and increase the rate of absorption of toxic oil in the mucous 
membranes of the mouth and nose. It was also revealed that one of the 
dispersants used on the spill (Dispolene 34s) was not licensed to be used 
in the U.K. Another one of the dispersants was criticized because it had 
never been approved for use along rocky shorelines. Yet another disper- 
sant, it was learned, was banned in Norway because it failed toxicity tests. 
12According to a number of informants, including officials of the Shetland Island Council 
there is considerable concern about secrecy and "conspiracies." For example, under Scottish 
law meetings are to be conducted in public; however, there is a process whereby public 
meetings including those of the council can be conducted as closed meetings if "commercially 
sensitive" matters are being discussed. It was under this veil of secrecy that the contract with 
BP to construct and operate the Sullom Voe facility was negotiated. Until this day, the 
general public does not  know the conditions of the contract. According to Wills (1991), "very 
large subsidies from council funds are handed out in secret." These conditions contribute to 
the suspicion and cynicism of the public and no doubt contributed to their fears during the 
spill crisis. 
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It wasn't until January 21 that U.K. Agriculture Minister David Curry ad- 
mitted that one of the dispersants had failed tests to be used on rocky 
shorelines and that another dispersant hadn't even been tested for use 
along rocky coasts because it was not developed for such usage. Finally he 
stated: "The disclosure of this information underlines that residents of the 
south Mainland of Shetland were well justified in expressing misgivings 
about the use of dispersants." 
The man who immediately found himself immersed in the middle 
of this controversy was Dr. Chris Rowlands, the general practitioner for 
the parish. In contrast to the assurances that all was well given by Dr. 
Cox, Dr. Rowlands advised school officials to not allow school children 
outside during recess. He also advised a public gathering that the crude 
oil contained three chemicals known to cause cancer: butadene, naphth- 
lane, and benzene. He questioned the use of dispersants, telling another 
public group that U.K. officials were keeping the chemical contents of 
the dispersants a secret even from him, the parishioners' physician. More- 
over, he alleged something that later was revealed to be true, that the 
U.K. was using an old, outdated stock of dispersants, and that they were 
unsure of their contents because they were mixing barrels of different 
chemicals. 13 
Alarmed over the symptoms many of his patients were exhibiting, Dr. 
Rowlands decided to begin clinical monitoring of his patients 2 days after 
the spill, at a time when the U.K. and local health board refused to conduct 
medical monitoring of the residents. Dr. Rowlands began taking blood and 
urine samples of the parishioners, especially those whose occupation forced 
them to spend most of their time outdoors. In an effort to conduct fuller 
tests, he phoned Dr. Campbell of the Scottish Health Board and asked 
him to begin tests on all the residents in the exposed regions. According 
to Rowlands, as eager as Dr. Campbell was to conduct the tests, he ran 
into severe opposition in the Scottish Home Office. However, once it was 
revealed in the press that Dr. Rowlands had been single-handedly conduct- 
ing tests the Home Office relented. Unfortunately, this was at least 10 days 
after the spill, and because of the time delay the tests were almost mean- 
ingless; moreover, they failed to test for carcinogens like benzene, toluene, 
and zylene. 
13Indeed the dispersants were so old that a number  of the barrels stored at the Sumburgh 
Airport  leaked and created their own spill problem. One  of the  security guards who worked 
at the airport informed me that some of the barrels were very old and rusty. A press release 
issued by the Shetland Island Council (1/27/93) stated that  "It is not  known how much has 
leaked but  it could potentially be 500 gallons." The  spill caused an uproar  on the island and 
further damaged the reputation of the MPCU.  
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Both Home Office officials and officials of the Shetland Islands 
Council pressured Dr. Rowlands to stop making public statements and 
conducting tests. Dr. Cox made public statements to the press that 
Dr. Rowlands was using scare mongering tactics and creating public 
hysteria. Cox also accused both Greenpeace and Bellona, a Norwegian 
environmental group, of being more of a public health hazard than the 
spill by causing unnecessary alarm. In an interview with me, Dr. Cox 
blamed the unrest on inflammatory statements made by "some individuals 
or groups from Alaska that told our people" that the public officials in 
Alaska withheld information and that U.K. officials would take the same 
tactic and must be challenged. 14 
Amid all this controversy, the islanders themselves were very con- 
cerned about the lack of testing and the use of dispersants. A petition, 
signed by several hundred people, to the Shetland Island Council de- 
manded, among other things, that there be an open investigation of the 
disaster and that all information regarding the use of chemical disper- 
sants be disclosed to the public. 15 According to Martin Hall, Director 
of Environmental Health, even members of the Shetland Island Council 
were upset over the use of dispersants, but when they protested to the 
MPCU they were told, "I don't care if you like it or not we are going 
to do it." The controversy over the spraying of dispersants came to a 
head when residents in S c a t n e s s -  a community immediately adjacent 
to the a i r p o r t -  and several airport employees threatened to sit down 
on the runways and block the planes from taking off. Malcolm Green, 
the Executive Director of the Shetland Island Council told me that it 
was at this point that he told the U.K.'s Department of Transport that 
he wanted the spraying discontinued. As a result of this demand a com- 
promise was reached whereby spraying would be limited to certain areas 
and allowed only at certain altitudes (Shetland Islands Council Public 
Notice, 1/10/93). 
14During the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, several grassroots community  activists visited the Shetland 
Islands to investigate the unique arrangements  the Shetland Island Council had negotiated 
with BP - -  the owner of  the Sullum Voe oil terminal. Many of these individuals were in 
contact with the Shetland Islands once the spill there  occurred and a small number  flew 
from Alaska to the Shetlands in order to share the lessons learned from the Exr, on-Valdez 
spill. All the  Shetlanders that  I encountered were very eager to hear  first-hand about the 
spill in Alaska, including most  Shetland Island Officials. Actually, the exchange between 
Alaska and the Shetlands predates this era considerably. In the 1970s, Alaskan politicians 
came to the Shetlands to inspect the Sullum Voe terminal and the arrangements  between 
the Shetland Island Council and BP. For an excellent history and account of  the oil industry 
in the Shetlands see Wills (1991). 
lSSalmon f ishermen and fish processors issued a joint s ta tement  as well opposing the 
indiscriminate use of dispersants. 
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The official word from the Scottish Home Office from the first day 
of the spill was that there would be no long-term health effects from the 
spill or the use of dispersants. This claim was largely unsubstantiated. For 
one thing, this spill was unique in that it was the first known instance of 
respirable oil droplets, rather than vapor being blown ashore and there 
were no pre-existing studies of the possible health hazards of such an event. 
To make matters worse, chemical dispersants were being used in unauthor- 
ized areas and contaminating nearby settlements. Furthermore, although 
there are some studies that suggest that dispersants increase the dangers 
of oil inhalation, we have no scientific knowledge of what effect the com- 
bination of oil and dispersants has on the human body. The only givens 
were that both the oil and the chemicals contained known carcinogens. 
Under these circumstances, accepted scientific practice would require the 
assumption of a risk and the taking of preventative action and monitoring 
the environment and the human population. 
In some ways, officials were monitoring animals better than people. 
Sheep and cattle that had died during the disaster were autopsied and 
biopsies were performed on the tissues of animals that were ill. However, 
as with the human medical situation, the test results were not released to 
the general public nor even to the veterinarian of Dunross Parish. The 
veterinarian was as unable as Dr. Rowlands to obtain information for his 
clients. 
Not until 11 days after the wreck occurred did the Scottish Office 
begin a limited medical survey of the population. Out of 640 individuals 
invited to participate 460 were tested along with a control group of 96 
individuals from the northern end of the island. The report showed no sig- 
nificant differences between the two populations. However, the tests were 
conducted far too late to detect the presence of toxic chemicals that may 
have been present in the body during the spill crisis and far too early to 
detect cellular abnormalities. Nor were tests conducted to monitor known 
carcinogens such as benzene (Fogg, 1993). In keeping with the secrecy sur- 
rounding the spill, Dr. Rowlands was not shown the test results until 2 
hours before the press conference at which the results were announced. 
Given such little time to review the report Dr. Rowlands was effectively 
stopped from making a meaningful contribution to the press conference. 
CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The human world, as Rappaport (1988) reminds us, does not consist 
merely of chemical and biological processes alone, but is saturated with 
meaning and value. Historically there are cultural conditions that predate 
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the North Sea oil era. For example, there are attitudes about off-islanders 
that figure predominately in the suspicion and distrust many islanders 
exhibited during the period of crisis. Native Shetlanders have a deep 
attachment to their non-British history and many identify strongly with their 
Scandinavian ancestry. Both the English and Scottish nationals who arrived 
e n  m a s s e  after the development of oil to work in the expanded economy 
were and are viewed with suspicion as "off-islanders": people who are 
insensitive to the Shetland way of life and who represent  British 
"neo-colonialism.'16 
More importantly, the crofts and the crofters are viewed by island na- 
tives as symbolizing an ancient way of life. 17 Crofts are viewed as land to 
which people have an inalienable right. They were originally protected in the 
larger context of Scottish Nationalism in the 1886 Act which made landlords 
powerless in making decisions that affect the use of crofting lands. While 
this special status was revoked in 1911, a new Crofters Act was produced in 
1955 after a government report (The Taylor Report, 1954) argued for the 
protection of crofting communities because "they embody a free and inde- 
pendent way of life which in a civilization predominately urban and industrial 
in character is worth preserving for its own intrinsic quality" (Parman, 1990). 
While today crofting is not a viable economic project for most, it is never- 
theless an important way of life (Cohen, 1987). 
The crofts are also landmarks that resonate with great symbolic sig- 
nificance since a family may have resided in a particular croft for many 
generations. Crofters' cottages are commonly built on, or around, the re- 
mains of earlier dwellings that predate them by as much as several thousand 
years. Crofts are in a sense the territory for a lineage. The croft also serves 
as an aggregate social identity and has traditionally been the core of fishing 
crews. An individual's identity is often permanently linked with the croft 
even if he or she lives in other parts of the archipelago. Most topographical 
features of crofts have personal names associated with their previous in- 
habitants. Thus, crofts have become "historical repositories" of family line- 
ages and the islands' cultural history (Cohen, 1987). 
16A11 of the principal actors responding to the disaster in an  official capacity were originally 
from the U.K. including Dr. Cox, the Director of  Public Health;  Malcolm Green,  Executive 
Director of  the Shetland Island Council; Martin Hall, Director of  the Environmental  Office. 
According to Wills (1991), most  of  the jobs at the Sullom Voe facility went to Scottish, Irish, 
and English workers - -  which contributes to the resentment  of  off-islanders. 
17parman (1990, p. 28) provides us with an interesting account of  the word croft: "The word 
croft is neither Gaelic nor  a Scottish term. It comes from Old English and corresponds to 
the Dutch krofl, a field on high grounds or downs. Gaelic uses  a number  of  words to refer 
to units  of  land . . . but  the word croft has entered Gaelic vocabulary fairly recently as a 
foreign, slightly Gaelized eroit or lot (from allotment), the word for crofter as croitear. A 
croft is a small unit  of  agriculturally substandard land, as contrasted with farm, which is 
larger and more  agriculturally viable." 
252 Button 
Seen from this perspective, the spraying of the crofts and their moors 
and the contamination of these croft dwellings, lands and topographical 
features was viewed by many as a violation perpetrated by an off-island, 
industrialized society. The crofters' inalienable right to the land was 
violated by the spraying of their lands and the refusal of U.K. officials to 
inform the crofters of the contents of the chemical solution that befouled 
both their economic livelihood and their crofters' cottages. Thus, the 
contamination and condemnation of the crofters' animals and lands 
threatened this way of life and desecrated, in a demonstrative way, the 
cultural heritage of the islands. 
The above discussion illustrates that when public authorities are 
assessing risks they need not only to consider the physical and psychological 
risks that accompany an oil spill or the use of dispersants, but the risks to 
the social and cultural fabric of a community. It is imperative to recognize 
that the trauma inflicted by disasters has an impact on our socioecological 
system as a whole. 
DISCUSSION 
Illustrative of the way many technological disasters are handled, the 
response to the wreck of the Braer was to use a quick technological fix 
(Button, 1994b). The solution to the problem was seen as an issue of 
engineering and thus the human dimensions of the disaster were relegated 
to the background and all but ignored. The human component was 
eventually brought to the fore when the local people protested the 
indiscriminate use of dispersants and the disregard for their health and 
safety. 
Why did Dr. Cox, the Director of Public Health, risk the credibility 
of his office so early in the disaster and refuse to release information that 
would enable the victims of the disaster to make their own risk analysis? 
The answer lies in at least two realms. In order to come to some "rational" 
judgment about the efficacy of using dispersants, Dr. Cox felt that he 
needed to know the chemical composition of the sprays. However, the 
manufacturers of the dispersants would not release the information unless 
it was under the cloak of "commercial confidence." In talking with Dr. Cox 
it was clear that he personally viewed his retaining of this confidence as a 
matter of great professional integrity. Constrained as he was by his own 
code of honor, he was also restricted by laws and policies of the United 
Kingdom which, despite being one of the seats of "democratic" tradition, 
has no right-to-know policy as formulated in the United States. 
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The European Community has established procedures for the 
communication of hazardous information which are distinctly different 
from the approach in the United States, which is predicated on a fed- 
erally mandated right-to-know law. 18 The European community has an 
information policy named after the tragic chemical accident in Italy. 
The Seveso Directive (1979) has established a framework which deline- 
ates the responsibility of both industry and government to communicate 
hazardous information to the public29 Industry is required to provide 
detailed accounts of toxic materials to a public authority; however, un- 
like the policy of the United States Government, the EC government 
authorities are not required to release the details of this information 
to the public (Collins, 1992). While information is seen as an important 
resource in both the United States and European community countries, 
European legislation and policies interprets public access to hazardous 
information based on a policy of the need to know rather than the right 
to know (Eijndhoven, 1994). Instead of having a policy of an open- 
ended access to all information, the Seveso Directive provides only ac- 
cess for specific information that is needed for a specific purpose. 
Within the European Community countries have varying policies as to 
the amount of access their citizens can have to risk data. The United 
Kingdom might be said to have the most restrictive approach in with- 
holding information from the general public. U.K. policies place em- 
phasis on providing scientific advisors with risk data and allowing them 
to make recommendations in the interest of the public, just as they did 
in the case of the Shetland Islands spill. 
Beyond these policy restrictions it is probably safe to surmise, given 
many off-the-record comments to me by both Shetland and U.IC officials, 
that Dr. Cox, as an employee of the Scottish Home Office, was under con- 
siderable pressure from U.K. officials to minimize public concern and to 
protect corporate interests. 
By March of 1993, Dr. Cox (Report dated Wednesday 31) adopted 
a different posture. In a conference report he stated: 
18The United States Congress in 1980 passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act, otherwise known as Superfund. The legislation was passed 
to identify toxic sites and polluters and to provide funding for clean-up. Later in 1986 
Congress passed the Superfund Reauthorization Act (SARA) which included right-to-know 
provisions. Many states have also passed community right-to-know legislation which also is 
supposed to insure that information on hazardous materials be made available to the public. 
For an excellent discussion of the limitations of this act and its implementation, see Hadden 
~1994). 
~Council Directive 82/501/EEC passed June 24, 1982. For a fuller discussion of this legislation, 
see Eijndhoven (1994). 
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In this incident, the manufacturers of the chemical dispersants used would release 
the complete chemical composition of their dispersants to public health authorities 
only on the understanding that it would be held in commercial confidence. I can 
not think that such confidence was necessary. The chemicals used were not 
themselves secret in any way, and it is difficult to believe that commercial rivals 
are not themselves capable of analyzing their competitor's products. If it had been 
possible to make the composition of these products public it would have been 
relatively easy to reassure the public about the safety of their use, but because 
authorities dealing with the incident were unable to release this information not 
only was there an unjustifiable public concern about the use of these dispersants, 
but the secrecy surrounding their use and composition seriously undermined the 
confidence of the public in the pronouncements made about the relative lack of 
risk to the public from the incident as a whole. The withholding of this information 
was the most serious hindrance to handling the public health dimensions of this 
incident, and did no credit to the companies concerned. 
Contrary to Dr. Cox's assertion, there still would have been contro- 
versy even if the information had been released to the public since the 
decision to use dispersants was quite controversial and undoubtedly unwise 
and unnecessary. Furthermore, the lack of adequate monitoring of both 
the environment and humans was unthinkable given the unique conditions 
surrounding the spill. There is no doubt, however, that the air of contro- 
versy would have been greatly diminished if vital information was not with- 
held from public scrutiny. The public had a right to ascertain for themselves 
the risks involved in the entire affair, their access to this information was 
critical; the refusal to release the information seriously eroded the credi- 
bility of the public health office to the point that the disaster victims be- 
came mistrustful of and hostile toward the office and increasingly suspicious 
of the circumstances surrounding the spill. The public clearly perceived that 
the interests of corporations were, in this instance, placed above the inter- 
ests of the public. 
As was noted in the introduction, uncertainty and controversy are not 
unusual in the wake of a technological disaster or oil spills in general. 
Considerable uncertainty was generated after the Shetland Islands oil spill, 
just as it was after the Exxon-Valdez oil spill (Button, 1993) or the Santa 
Barbara spill (1969) (Molotch, 1970; Easton, 1972). As in these other spills 
the climate of withholding information generated increased uncertainty 
about the credibility and trustworthiness of officials, since uncertainty is 
often "equated with surreptitiousness and incompetence" (Marrett, 1981). 
Moreover, increased uncertainty only adds to the number of interpretations 
which can be made about a disaster. In this case, as in most, the knowledge 
that was withheld was not only a key to meaning, but in very real terms a 
key to power (Keesing, 1987). People construct their social realities by 
making interpretations and conferring meaning based on knowledge. 
Access to knowledge is crucial. People employ knowledge in order to cope; 
they use knowledge to not only interpret events but to act. The limited 
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access of the Shetland Islanders to knowledge left them in a precarious 
position and decreased their ability to both cope and to act. Both the U.K. 
disaster response team and the Public Health Office failed to incorporate 
into their response the perceptions and reactions of the local people. By 
not providing community members with hazard information, they denied 
the victims the knowledge with which to interpret and respond to the event 
in a meaningful manner. By withholding information, officials both 
narrowed the terms of the debate about the interpretation of the disaster 
and narrowed the number of informed participants who could participate 
in the debate. 
If there is a lesson to be learned it is this: the local perception of 
risk is mediated by the perception of how risk is being managed by officials. 
As important as the disaster event itself, is the way it is perceived and 
interpreted by the community. Anxiety is minimized if the risk is perceived 
as being adequately managed and remediated; however, if local residents 
become distrustful of local government, local concern over risk will increase 
(see Fitchen et al., 1987; Edelstein, 1988; Button, 1993). The risk 
management strategies of the U.K. and the local public health office failed 
to take this into consideration and thus not only added to the air of 
uncertainty and anxiety, but made a crucial difference in whose 
interpretations were heard and whose interpretations were excluded. 
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